
Anxiety in Heidegger's Being and Time

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ABSTRACT

I argue that anxiety, in the sense Heidegger intends, is an ontological determination of Dasein: an essential possibility, an *existential* possibility inherent in being-a-self (*Selbstsein*). I explain and criticise Blattner's characterisation of anxiety as depression, highlighting how Heidegger's concept needs to be distanced from the pathologised, ontic version with which it is so easily associated. Anxiety is instead ontological, as necessitated by Heidegger's clear intent for it to play a role in his account of the unity of the self. I address more specific claims in relation to §40 put forth by Blattner, and by Dreyfus and Rubin, on whose interpretation Blattner's is modelled. This brings to light clear issues in their interpretation, which cannot allow for such a unity. On this basis, I give an alternative reading by interpreting anxiety through an account of the life and works of Martin Luther, as a possible way of resolving these issues in a manner which has greater coherence with elements in both divisions.

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Abbreviations of Primary Sources

The following list provides abbreviations of works cited in parentheses in the body of the text. The references are given, wherever possible, to the original language version, with the German page numbers denoted by the letter H. Where this is not available or applicable, references are to the corresponding English translation. If no text has been indicated, the reference is to Heidegger's *Being and Time*.

Works by Martin Heidegger and their abbreviations, in historical order:

- BPP** 1982 (1927). *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Translated from the German by A. Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- PSL** 2002 (1924). The Problem of Sin in Luther. Translated from the German by John van Buren. In *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, edited by John van Buren. Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 105–110.
- BT** 2008 (1927). *Being and Time*. Translated from the German by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Thought.
- PIK** 1997 (1927–8). *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*. Translated from the German by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- WM** 1998 (1929). What is Metaphysics?. Translated from the German by David Farrell Krell. In *Pathmarks*, edited by William McNeill. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 82–96.
- FCM** 1995 (1929–30). *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. Translated from the German by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- LH** 1998 (1949). Letter on "Humanism". Translated from the German by Frank A. Capuzzi. In *Pathmarks*, edited by William McNeill. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 239–276.
- Z** 2001 (1947–72). *Zollikon seminars: protocols, conversations, letters*, edited by Medard Boss. Translated from the German and with notes and afterwords by Franz Mayr and Richard Askay. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Works by Martin Luther and their abbreviations:

LW25 1972. Luther's Works, vol. 25: Lectures on Romans: Scholia and Glosses. St. Louis: Concordia.

LW29 1968. Luther's Works, vol. 29: Lectures on Titus, Philemon, Hebrews. St. Louis: Concordia.

LW31 1957. Luther's Works, vol. 31: The Career of the Reformer I. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press.



Introduction

As a bridge to Division II, Heidegger's notion of anxiety is crucial to an interpretation of *Being and Time* (BT) as a cohesive whole—a notoriously elusive task. One of the predominant schools of interpretation of Heidegger's thought is the Anglo-American school characterised by the post-Analytic work of Hubert Dreyfus, who reads Heidegger through a neo-Wittgensteinian, neo-pragmatist constructivism.¹ This style of interpretation, which I shall term the 'Dreyfus School' interpretation, emphasises the phenomenology of the everyday presented in Division I, and particularly the role of Being-with (*Mitsein*) and the One (*das Man*) in the social construction of norms, meaning and identity.² Such readings raise issues around how to understand the relationship between the inauthentic or everyday Dasein which Heidegger analyses in Division I; and authentic Dasein, as treated in Division II. As with the two published divisions of BT, these notions need to be interpreted in such a way that they are neither rendered too thinly, nor made to appear inconsistent with one another.³ As we shall see, the Dreyfus School interpretation fails on both counts due to its neo-Wittgensteinian, neo-pragmatist constructivism, which leads to an overemphasis on Division I.⁴

From the outset, this thesis takes seriously Heidegger's claim that BT is a fundamental ontology—that is, a preparation for ontology or “science of being *as such*” (H230)—of Dasein. Heidegger seeks to raise anew the question of the meaning of Being, and in order to do so it is essential to start from the beginning: this question is formulated by an

¹ Boedecker, 2008. Note that I do not use terms such as pragmatism or constructivism in the sense employed in discourse surrounding Foucault. Such terms are intended in their more 'post-Analytic' or 'Anglo-American' senses.

² *Ibid.*, 334.

³ Boedecker, 2001, argues for the existence of both against Dreyfus, who prioritises inauthenticity, and also against Olafson, who prioritises authenticity; cf. Christensen, 2012; Brogan, 2005, 150f.

⁴ As characterized by Brogan, 2005, 150. Cf. Boedecker, 2001; MacAvoy, 2001.

entity or entities who inquire into it (§2). This entity, which Heidegger terms Dasein, does not just happen to formulate this question but does so because, as the entity that can think “I am” (and all this will entail), it has a relationship with Being itself (§4). Thus not only does Dasein develop all sorts of ontologies; it “provides the condition for the possibility of any ontologies” (H13). Ontically, it is evident that this being exists as essentially Being in a world. Hence it must relate to the world and the beings accessible in it, which it on some level understands: “Dasein already comports itself, in its Being, towards what we are asking about” (H15). It is in this sense not only ontological but prior to ontology: thus, the ontology of Dasein itself, understood as the entity (*Seiendes*) able to raise this question into view (§2), is that which we must study first and foremost if we are to move towards the question of the meaning of Being. Consequently, the notions explored in BT are to be taken seriously as ontological determinations of Dasein.

This provides a basis upon which it might be shown—admittedly reconstructively—that anxiety is a possibility latent in Dasein. We shall see that Heidegger thinks of anxiety as fundamental in any account of how Dasein forms a coherent totality both at a point in time—a unity of its structural moments—and across time, as something which in *some* sense exists as one and the same backwards and forwards through time, and knows itself as so existing. This shows that in order to appreciate how Heidegger uses the concept of anxiety, one needs to read his account in a formal-ontological way, that is, as part of fundamental ontology; specifically, as discussing the particular way in which Dasein exhibits such formal ontological notions as unity and difference, remaining the one and the same across time, and being a whole.⁵

Chapter One addresses this by developing an outline of anxiety with critical reference to William Blattner’s psychological reading, highlighting how the anxiety Heidegger discusses in §40 must be distanced from this pathologised, ontic version.⁶

⁵ Christensen, 2009, PHIL2097, Lecture on BT Division II, ANU.

⁶ This chapter focuses on §40, so due to limited space I do not deal with Blattner’s reading of anxiety/death.

Blattner's interpretation of Heidegger originates in the Dreyfus School and inherits its reliance on attributing considerable incoherence to Heidegger's text.⁷ In his book *Being and Time: A Reader's Guide* (2006), Blattner interprets Heidegger's notion of anxiety as "closer to our contemporary conception of depression."⁸ As I explain in Chapter One, this approach misunderstands and underemphasises the character of BT as fundamental ontology, leading Blattner to 'onticise' concepts which, properly understood, are ontological determinations of Dasein. However tempting it may seem—it is a common misconception upon first contact with the text—we cannot map anxiety in BT onto clinical psychological disorders. If we do so, we miss the role anxiety plays in Heidegger's treatment of the unity of the self; and thus we fail to be able to account for the pre-phenomenological sense of unity or unified identity which each one of us has.

Chapter Two examines the accounts of §40 given by Blattner and by Dreyfus and Rubin (henceforth D&R) in more detail. Here I argue that anxiety must be interpreted so as we can make sense of Heidegger's claim that anxiety is connected with the way, or sense, in which Dasein is a whole. In particular, anxiety needs to be interpreted in a way that recognises that the one-self (*man-selbst*) is what Dasein is *at least*, that is, there is a possibility that there could be something more to Dasein which BT has so far overlooked. In this respect, Blattner and D&R give readings which prove inadequate: for, if we take Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology seriously, we cannot interpret anxiety as either the annihilation of the self (D&R) or a state in which the self only exists trivially (Blattner). To do justice to Heidegger's account, anxiety needs to be seen as an *ontologically fundamental* affective disposedness (*Grundbefindlichkeit*)⁹ which phenomenologically reveals that, *pace* Dreyfus, Dasein is more than a one-self; being-a-one-self is not all there

⁷ Blattner, 1999; Dreyfus and Rubin, 2001, 333 (henceforth D&R). Cf. Boedeker, 2001, 64.

⁸ Blattner, 2006, 13.

⁹ Personal communication with Carleton Christensen leads me to translate 'Befindlichkeit' as 'affective disposedness' over 'state-of-mind' (Macquarie and Robinson). All ontic moods or attunements (Stimmungen) disclose how Dasein is as it finds itself (§29). 'Affective disposedness' refers to the ontological structure implicit in all such ontic moods and attunements (H134, cf. z H182).

is to being-a-self, a claim which underpins and justifies the need to move beyond Division I into Division II.

Lastly, in Chapter Three, I give an alternative interpretation of anxiety, one which is designed to overcome the limitations of the existing interpretations. Here, I read Heidegger's account of anxiety in tandem with an account of the life and works of Martin Luther, illustrating one way in which it is possible to resolve the issues raised in the preceding chapters in manner which preserves and enhances the overall coherence of *BT*, in particular the relation between Division I and Division II.

I. Establishing the ontological status of Anxiety: A problem of unity

This chapter examines Blattner's account of what Heidegger means by anxiety, as delivered in *A Reader's Guide to 'Being and Time'* (2006). In this book, Blattner characterises anxiety by mapping it onto medical definitions of depression.¹⁰ In doing so, this chapter gathers resources for a more adequate interpretation. Anxiety, for Blattner, is a factual mood, hence an ontic phenomenon. According to him, its role is to provide the phenomenologist with evidence for the ontological claim that the roots of Dasein lie in the social construction of meaning and self-constitution.¹¹ I explore the extent to which this position can be plausibly read into Heidegger's text and conclude that it cannot. This is because Blattner's interpretation cannot make sense of the fact that Heidegger attempts to use anxiety in his account of the unity of the structural moments of Dasein which he has thus far distinguished in BT: if we accept Blattner's interpretation, then this becomes, at the very least, inexplicable. To account for how Heidegger can relate anxiety to the question of unity of Dasein as a structural whole, we need to understand Heidegger's account of anxiety in §40 as ontological. Here, the necessity of taking seriously Heidegger's project as a preliminary fundamental ontology is particularly conspicuous. I conclude by setting out, on the basis of these issues, three conditions which a coherent account of anxiety in §40 must fulfil.

Blattner's account of anxiety as depression

Blattner's approach is influenced by the Anglo-American school of Heidegger interpretation advanced by his teacher Hubert Dreyfus, who, in his interpretation of Heidegger, appeals to "the later Wittgenstein, classical American pragmatism, and

¹⁰ Blattner, 2006, 142.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 139–40.

neo-pragmatism.”¹² As such, Blattner works in the tradition of what Boedecker terms the “neo-social-behaviourist” school of thought,¹³ which “attempts to explain philosophical concepts (human being, mind, justification, assertion, truth, reference, etc.) in terms of a single basic concept: normative social practices.”¹⁴ This style of interpretation thus reads Heidegger as primarily interested in the everyday constitution of meaning of Being-with (*Mitsein*) and *das Man*, and is concerned to find a basis for the ‘mind’ and scientific knowledge in concrete practice.¹⁵ Consequently, Blattner, like Dreyfus, concentrates on Division I of BT, emphasizing Heidegger’s analysis of everydayness over his treatment of authenticity in Division II.¹⁶

Blattner interprets Heidegger’s concept of anxiety as being akin to “our contemporary conception of depression.”¹⁷ He indicates the similarities between Heidegger’s description of anxiety and the clinical description of depression:

In such a condition, one withdraws into isolation, loses interest in the world around one, stops taking pleasure in everyday life, loses motivation to carry on. Heidegger’s descriptions of what he calls ‘anxiety’ fit this model quite well: the world ‘has nothing to offer,’ and neither do others; one cannot understand oneself anymore; one feels uncanny and not-at-home.¹⁸

This permits him to appeal to the psychological concept of anhedonia as a way of characterising how Heidegger sees the relationship between anxious Dasein and the

¹² *Ibid.*, 334.

¹³ Boedecker, 2008, 335.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 343.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Blattner, 2006, 13, see 141–3.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 142.

world, namely, as a “loss of desire and pleasure” symptomatic of “the flattening out of experience and the withdrawal from the possibilities of life that have heretofore been meaningful.”¹⁹ Dasein flees in the face of anxiety just as some sufferers of anhedonia hide “in vigorous pleasure-seeking, such as hypersexuality or violence,” a phenomenon for which he finds parallels in Dostoyevsky and in the movie *American Beauty*.²⁰ Since these conditions alone do not account for everything Heidegger describes, Blattner considers the psychiatric conception of anxiety as a clinical disorder. Heidegger describes how in anxiety “what threatens is *nowhere*” (H186), and this, Blattner explains, “generates a response typical of anxiety” which we today call a panic attack.²¹

that which threatens cannot bring itself close from a definite direction within what is close by; it is already ‘there’, and yet nowhere; it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one’s breath, and yet it is nowhere (H186).

Thus, he concludes, “it may be that Heidegger really has in mind what is sometimes called ‘agitated depression.’”²²

While there are certainly similarities between Heidegger’s description of anxiety and that of clinical conditions, these ontic phenomena do not, I believe, provide an appropriate model for understanding Heidegger’s concept of anxiety as he explains it in §40. Blattner’s interpretation of anxiety is linked to his position on death and temporality (as explicated in his doctoral dissertation and book, *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism* (1999)), which presupposes the way he reads Division I. A full rebuttal of his position on anxiety would therefore require a critique both of his (and Dreyfus’s) entire interpretation of Division I and of his characterisation of Heidegger as a temporal idealist in relation to Kant.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 141.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*, 142.

This is something that is beyond the scope of this thesis.²³ I believe, however, that there is sufficient evidence within §39–41 alone to show that Heidegger does not conceive of anxiety as merely an ontic phenomenon. And, if this is so, then, since Blattner’s interpretation forces him to ‘onticise’ anxiety, we have a powerful reason for thinking that approach is misleading. Additionally, the fact that Heidegger regards anxiety as genuinely ontological is itself pivotal in determining the form an adequate interpretation might take.

Against ‘onticising’ anxiety

Heidegger tells us in §40 that while “anxiety is often conditioned by ‘physiological’ factors,” we need to “Interpret this phenomenon according to the principles of its existential-ontological Constitution and function” (H190). As a first move in doing this, he distinguishes anxiety from fear. Fear, for Heidegger, is directed at some specific ontic phenomenon, coming towards us in some sense, which we are thus able to recognize as threatening (H140–2, H341–3). Dasein fears for a specific aspect of its existence endangered by something within the world (e.g. the meteor about to strike you) or in the world (e.g. the intruder in your house). Fear of harm or death can be experienced for another, or for oneself. In either case, this is precisely *fear* of harm or death, not anxiety about either. Anxiety as Heidegger understands it is, by contrast, defined through its lack of a specific endangering object. This distinction between fear and anxiety has a long history; it is made by many, including Freud, Kierkegaard and popular medical science.²⁴ Yet while for Freud (and, following him, psychiatry in general) a specific object of anxiety can be determined at least provisionally,²⁵ for Heidegger, anxiety never involves awareness of a definite entity (H186, H343–4). This is not to say that for Heidegger it is ‘objectless’ in the sense of not being directed at anything. For Heidegger does say that it is directed at

²³ Against Dreyfus’s interpretation of Division I see Christensen, 2012; McAvoy, 2001, Bracken, 2005.

²⁴ Visker, 2004, 59–64.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 60.

something, namely, something very general: the very possibility of Being itself (H187). This already indicates that assimilating anxiety in Heidegger's sense to anything resembling either standard notions of fear or psychological anxiety will be problematic.

Ontological Object, Ontological anxiety

Heidegger understands anxiety as “the distinctive way in which Dasein is disclosed” (H184). This indicates two senses in which anxiety is to be understood ontologically. As both King and Mulhall note, it is an essential possibility of Dasein built into the ontological constitution of Dasein *as a possibility*. Furthermore, what anxiety is concerned with—what it is directed at—is itself ontological.²⁶ One is anxious in the face of that which is “nothing and nowhere within-the-world” (H186); that is, Heidegger explains, anxiety concerns precisely the phenomenon of “*Being-in-the-world as such*” (H187, italics original). Anxiety is indeed implicated in Dasein's ontological constitution; only for this reason is it a fundamental affective disposedness (*Grundbefindlichkeit*) to which special phenomenological significance may be accorded.²⁷ Not only is it an essential possibility of Dasein, but, *its object* is ontological and this, as we shall see, allows the phenomenologist an access point to the deeper ontological structures of Dasein.

Crucially, this enables us to understand a further difference Heidegger finds between anxiety and fear. As he explains in §40 and reemphasises in H343–5, to suffer anxiety is to be *freed* from absorption in the world whereas fear has just the opposite effect: it brings Dasein close to the world, illuminating Dasein's ‘there-ness’. Whatever anxiety is precisely, it distinguishes itself from fear through being “essentially incapable of having an involvement” (H186). In anxiety, the significance of things experienced in involvement fall away in the sense that they lose their driving motivational force. While the mood of fear is definite and centred, anxiety decentres: it “brings [Dasein] back from its absorption in the ‘world,’” so that “everyday familiarity collapses” (H189). Anxiety is “completely

²⁶ King, 1964, 127–36; Mulhall, 2005a, 307–8; 2005b, 110–2.

²⁷ Fell, 1990, 27.

indefinite; ... what threatens is nowhere” (H186). This is precisely because its object is ontological rather than something ontic. For this reason, it is wrong to interpret Heidegger’s claim that anxiety is completely indefinite, as if it were a vague and contourless sense of unease. Heidegger makes this clear in H342–4, where he differentiates anxiety from that vague and contourless fear of something (or other) within-the-world, in which one “forgets oneself” in “depression or bewilderment” and therefore “does not take hold of any definite possibility” but rather “makes present a jumble of hovering possibilities” (H342). When Heidegger speaks of the “indeterminateness” of anxiety, he means something ‘non-particular,’ something general, in other words, precisely something ontological and not ontic. The anxiety Heidegger intends at this point is anxious in the face of an *ontological* characteristic of Dasein, precisely Being-in-the-world.

Anxiety, then, is not merely, as Blattner suggests, “of ontological interest, because it exposes the sorts of entity we are, people who can come to find the world and its human possibilities irrelevant.”²⁸ Anxiety, *qua* fundamental affective disposedness, does not expose anything as ontic as this. Rather, it is capable of showing us Being-in-the-world, allowing us to “existential-ontologically, ... grasp it as such” (H185). As King argues, if we are to take seriously the character of the *object* of anxiety as ontological, then anxiety in the sense that Heidegger intends must itself be ontological: it must be an ontological possibility within Dasein’s being, for only so *can* it function to disclose Dasein as Dasein in this phenomenologically important way.²⁹

Everyday vs. Ontological Anxiety

Clearly the notion of anxiety is wielded pre-philosophically in everyday life as meaning something which is not ontological in the sense just indicated—and this must bear some relation to anxiety in Heidegger’s sense. This suggests that a further distinction needs to be made; one which, although not in Heidegger’s text, is nonetheless necessary if we are

²⁸ Blattner, 2006, 141.

²⁹ King, 1964, 127–136, esp. 128, 134.

to understand what Heidegger means when he speaks of anxiety, that is, between anxiety in the everyday sense of a mood—the ontic sense of anxiety—and anxiety in the ontological sense Heidegger intends.³⁰ Pre-philosophically, we often describe someone as anxious rather than fearful when what he or she is concerned about is not harm but failure relative to standards of assessment which matter to him or her.³¹ For instance, a student's anxiety about a forthcoming exam stems (in most cases) not from fear of harmful consequences but, rather, of the failure to measure up to a personally acknowledged standard that implicates their sense of self-worth. Thus everyday anxiety is not merely fear but rather the fear *of failure*, relative to some standard which matters to one. This is a fear both *about* loss of and *for* (the sake of) preserving one's sense of worth and self. Roughly speaking, in everyday anxiety one is anxious both *about* and *for* this sense of worth and self, a sense of worth and self which is bound up with meeting some definite standard within-the-world.

Determining the relationship between anxiety in the everyday sense and how Heidegger means it will allow us to justify Heidegger's use of the term; helping us to understand the sense in which ontic anxiety provides a clue to the meaning of ontological anxiety. Let us now explore this definition of everyday anxiety as a fear of failure rather than harm further. Not failing the exam matters to the student because of what failure would say about the extent to which the student measures up as the kind of person they would ideally be. This, as I shall argue in Chapter Three, provides a crucial clue as to the meaning of anxiety in the ontological sense. In ontological anxiety, what is at issue is Being-in-the-world 'actually' or 'factically' as Being-in-the-world, that is, as this entity Dasein whose 'essence' (H42, H233) is defined by existing (*Existenz*—existing, but in Heidegger's special sense). Implicit in this is Dasein's 'in each case mineness' (*Jemeinigkeit*): Dasein has essentially a sense of who and what it is individually, as the distinct

³⁰ I owe this distinction to personal communication with Carleton Christensen, 2009–12; cf. Chen, 2010, 2.

³¹ *Ibid.*

entity it itself is. This is (a) an *axiologically charged identity* which (b) matters to it: Dasein has a sense of who and what it would ideally be, e.g., a computer programmer. This is an identity it takes to be ‘worthy’ and which it is concerned to realise. That this sense of self is axiologically charged follows from the fact that if it were not, then Dasein would be concerned merely for its existence in the *ordinary* sense of the term, that is, its continuing-to-exist as whatever it just happened to be. In short, Dasein's sense of self must include a sense of self-worth or value beyond the mere continuation of its existence; otherwise, this would be the only thing that mattered to Dasein.

This character of Dasein, as structurally oriented towards something or someone it would ideally be, enables us to understand what Heidegger means when he says that Dasein is Being towards-the-ability-to-be which it itself is (H192). Indeed, as understanding, Dasein is ability-to-be (*Seinkönnen*)³²—for this entails that Dasein as it *actually* or *factically* is, is a *more or less* adequate exemplification of who and what it would ideally be. Evidently, the degree to which it exemplifies who and what it would ideally—how far away it is, so to speak, from being who and what it would ideally—is a matter of *its capacity in the specific and concrete circumstances*³³ to be who and what it would ideally be. I may be prevented from being who or what I would ideally be by, for example, insufficient financial resources, or my lack of resolution and will power. Nonetheless, I factually am, as an ability-to-be, something and someone in relation to this. If Dasein has this structure, then *everyday* anxiety is manifestly an inherent ontological possibility of Dasein. As I show in Chapter Three, the ontological structure of *everyday* anxiety is related to the ontological structure of anxiety in the ontological sense intended by Heidegger—which helps us understand what the latter is and why it, too, is an ontological possibility of Dasein. If this issue (of ability-to-be) is indeed what is at issue in the ontological sense

³² See H148, where Heidegger says that Dasein is, as understanding, Being-towards-possibilities, hence ability-to-be. Heidegger's use of the term ‘ability-to-be’ seems to vary slightly between contexts.

³³ While circumstances can be internal or external, or any mix of the two, I believe it is wrong to attribute a distinct dichotomy to Heidegger by saying it is limited by its internal or external circumstances, as this implies a classical subjectivity and notion of causation.

intended by Heidegger, it is then possible to see in the structure of ontological anxiety an intrinsic connection to anxiety in the everyday, ontic sense—which explains and justifies why we may describe both as kinds of anxiety.

For the moment it suffices to note that the student’s anxiety is precisely not anxiety in the sense Heidegger intends in §40. In such everyday cases there are, as Mulhall points out, sensible and legitimate ways we can manage and deal with our situation.³⁴ This is also true of anxiety in the sense used in psychological and psychiatric contexts. Here, anxiety is a clinical disorder that can be and often requires medication—be this pharmacological, some kind of behavioural therapy, or even such things as a change in diet, exercise levels or lifestyle adjustments. Anxiety *qua* clinical disorder, while more prolonged and perhaps less specific than the student’s anxiety about the exam, is still a decidedly ontic form of anxiety.

Anxiety as fundamental affective disposedness

Heidegger tells us that “‘real’ anxiety is rare” (H190). Heidegger’s use of the word ‘real’, here, is informative: it shows us that Heidegger’s method is to start precisely with the everyday, taking from it clues to the more phenomenologically, ontologically, primordial/original (H13–14). While all ontic moods or attunements (*Stimmungen*) disclose how Dasein is as it finds itself in the world (§29), ‘affective disposedness’ (*Befindlichkeit*, translated as ‘state-of-mind’ by Macquarie and Robinson) is used to refer to an ontological structure implicit in all such ontic moods and attunements (H134, cf. z H182). The term “affective *disposedness*” emphasises the way in which any such condition, of which anxiety is one, is not merely a momentary or transitory event or state which comes and goes, which perhaps passes in and out consciousness, but rather a standing disposition permeating our Being, our existence,³⁵ of whose presence in one’s ontological constitution one is latently aware at least in the sense that *when* it becomes explicit, it does not

³⁴ Mulhall, 2011, 125.

³⁵ Morin, 2009, 38.

come from nowhere but is familiar, as something which had been constantly threatening to manifest itself (H192).³⁶ Anxiety is not contingently episodic but “is latent in Being-in-the-world” (H190). And “[o]nly because Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its Being, does it become possible for anxiety to be elicited physiologically” (H190).

All this contrasts with Blattner’s position. In an earlier article, Blattner argues that Heidegger’s existentialism is similar to Sartre’s: Blattner identifies Sartre’s claim that “existence comes before essence”³⁷ with Heidegger’s statement that the ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence (*Existenz*) (see H42). He then reads both as follows: “humans are given their content neither by an ahistorical, trans-cultural essence, nor by nature. Rather, Dasein determines its content in its self-understanding.”³⁸ By this, Blattner means that (1) Dasein can have no essence in any sense at all, and as such, (2) no particular attunement or *particular affective disposedness* may be built into or essential to Dasein.³⁹ Consequently, (3) Dasein cannot be guaranteed to find itself in any particular way.⁴⁰

Heidegger’s analysis in §29 appears, at least superficially, to support (3). But Heidegger clearly does not hold (1), as he makes evident in the ‘Letter on Humanism’ (BT, H159-160; see also BT H233). Importantly, claim (2) reflects Blattner’s failure to distinguish clearly between ontic attunement or mood and its ontological basis in some basic affective disposedness. Manifestly, the failure to distinguish (or to take seriously the distinction) between ontic attunement or mood and its ontological basis in an affective disposedness makes it impossible to distinguish anxiety in the everyday, ontic sense, as a mood or attunement, and anxiety in the ontological sense, as a *fundamental* affective disposedness (*Grundbefindlichkeit*). One is then forced to assert (3), that is, that there is no fundamental (affective) way Dasein is. Heidegger, however, does not hold this position.

³⁶ See Morin, 2009, 38; King, 1964, 128.

³⁷ Sartre, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, 1960, 289.

³⁸ Blattner, 1996, 177.

³⁹ Blattner, 1999, 87.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Furthermore, one need not, on the basis of Heidegger's claim that the 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence, maintain, as Blattner does, that the ontological structure of Dasein is such that the only ontological structures Dasein can have are constituted by, and thus completely contingent upon, its historical and cultural milieu. Fundamental ontology can describe the structures and determinations of Dasein in a way that is trans-historical and trans-cultural *without* postulating a 'human essence' in any traditional metaphysical sense—that is, by describing the structures and determinations constituting Dasein's existing (in the ordinary sense) in the manner of that mode of Being Heidegger calls *Existenz*. Dasein is an entity capable of the "I am" (see especially H211, H317). As such, Heidegger maintains, each individual Dasein has an identity which is in some sense *its own*: in each case there is something which it is, as the particular instance of Dasein and existence that it is. Moreover, because it has awareness of itself as at least itself—it can at least think, "I am"—it is at least able to have explicit awareness of an identity as *its*: there is for Heidegger an "'I' which maintains itself throughout its manifold Experiences", even though this 'I' shows itself to be much more than this and however radically it must be distinguished from the self of the authentically existing self (H130). As such, Dasein is only possible if there is some identity which it is and of which it is to *some* extent aware as *its*. Heidegger's account of anxiety is a crucial part of his account of the selfhood of the self and why it is insufficient and misleading to restrict oneself to such notions of the self as that which maintains itself in the manifold of experiences. As already noted, Heidegger regards his account of anxiety as essential to his account of how Dasein, as an entity capable of the "I am" and characterised by selfhood, is unified as a structural whole of the various moments he has distinguished in Division prior to Chapter Six, in which anxiety is discussed as part of showing that the structural wholeness of Dasein is care. To this issue I now turn.

The question of unity *qua* wholeness

It is crucial to note where and how Heidegger introduces his phenomenological account of anxiety: in Chapter Six of Division I, to which the task has been explicitly assigned of accounting for the unity *qua* wholeness of Dasein: “anxiety—together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it—provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein’s primordial totality of Being” (H182). As Mulhall explains, prior to Chapter Six, Division I has not accounted for the unity it presupposes of the various aspects of Dasein and thus of the selfhood it describes.⁴¹ Heidegger demonstrates in Division I that we are essentially in-the-world, and we are assured that “Being-in-the-world is a structure which is primordially and constantly whole” (H180). But we cannot yet account for the totality of these distinguishable moments—Dasein’s worldliness, its Being-in and its Being-with others, its being as a one-self and its being in essential relation to *das Man*, as the ‘who’ of Dasein (H181).⁴² Crucially, in saying this, Heidegger is already telling us that somehow the notion of the one-self reached in Chapter 4 does not suffice to account for this unity—in which case, Dasein *qua* self must be more than a one-self. The very structure and organisation of the text insinuates that if we wish to understand the unity *qua* wholeness of Dasein, then we need to move beyond the one-self, hence to overcome the idea of the self as *totally* and *irrevocably* dispersed in *das Man*.⁴³

As Mulhall indicates,⁴⁴ if we are going to develop an account of the self in this way, we cannot simply accumulate discrete information about the self and combine it together, *ad hoc*, in a bottom-up account of the wholeness of Dasein. This would be to construe Dasein as merely an aggregate whole, which is incoherent. Rather, we need to look for

⁴¹ Mulhall, 2005b, 110.

⁴² See MacAvoy, 2001, 468–70.

⁴³ Mulhall, 2005b, 110.

⁴⁴ Mulhall, 2005a, 297.

something that is already there, which guides the way towards that which unifies the various aspects and moments distinguished thus far (H181). For Heidegger, anxiety is this phenomenon—this is because, at the ontic level, it is that in which Dasein is confronted with the structure of its existence *as a whole* and so it provides, at the level of phenomenologically conducted ontological analysis, the key to an account of Dasein’s unity *qua* structural whole of the moments distinguished thus far (H182).⁴⁵ Thus, Heidegger says that anxiety is “[the] way of disclosure in which Dasein brings itself before itself ... such that in it Dasein becomes accessible as simplified in a certain manner,” allowing us to shed light on “the structural totality of the Being we seek” (H182).

To see how anxiety might contribute to an account of this unity, let us consider the general account of Dasein and its worldliness given so far. Heidegger says that Dasein, by reason of that affective disposedness which essentially belongs to it, has a mode of being in which it is brought before itself disclosed to itself in its thrownness (H181). We also know from Chapter 4, in which Heidegger characterises Dasein as a unity of being-a-self and being-with(-others), that Dasein is not to be understood as a Cartesian locus of intentional states and experiences—whether this locus be seen as a mere Humean bundle, such that the self is *identical* with the set of intentional states or experiences at any one time, or as more tightly bound together by an ego which, as an underlying principle of unity, is not identical with the latter. At a minimum, Dasein is a generic, average self, acting out worldly social roles, hence in essential and intelligible relation to others.⁴⁶ Dasein must therefore be no less than a one-self, existing in essential relation to *das Man*, understood as a body of shared belief about what one typically or averagely is and does. For it is only in and through such a body of shared belief not just that the behaviour of others is intelligible to oneself and one’s own behaviour intelligible to them but that thereby one’s

⁴⁵ See Mulhall, 2005b, 110–115; Davis, 2007, 31.

⁴⁶ Mulhall, 2005a, 298

own behaviour is intelligible *thereby to oneself*⁴⁷ (§§ 25–27)⁴⁸. But to say that this is what Dasein *at least* is, is to imply that there is more to it than is explained by analysis of the one-self and *das Man* alone. This is intimated as early as §9, where Heidegger gives formal indications for the average, undifferentiated Dasein: by talking of Dasein as average, *undifferentiated*, Heidegger leaves open the possibility for Dasein to be more than this:

At the outset of our analysis it is particularly important that Dasein ... should be uncovered [aufgedeckt] in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part. ... We call this undifferentiated character of Dasein ‘averageness’. (H43)

The analysis offered in Division I up until Chapter Six deals positively only with this *average* or *generic* everydayness of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. And precisely for this reason it has not, according to Heidegger, yet accounted for the wholeness of Dasein, i.e., the unity of the moments of it distinguished thus far.⁴⁹ Consequently, there is something about the self which is fundamentally not captured in such an analysis.⁵⁰

Blattner misses this. For him, anxiety belongs solely with death, guilt and conscience in Division II: “Heidegger intended this dimension to be located in Division II, but ... he misplaced some of the existentialist material into Division I.”⁵¹ It appears where it does merely because it “plays an important evidentiary role in BT it confirms Heidegger’s ontological account of existence.”⁵² That is, to Blattner, the description of anxiety in §40 is phenomenologically significant simply as extra, thoroughly ontic evidence which pro-

⁴⁷ See Christensen, 2012.

⁴⁸ A simplistic explanation is that Dasein is “in each case mine”(§9), and hence requires a ‘who’ to call ‘mine’. Heidegger’s existential phenomenology places Dasein firmly in-the-world with-others, so other Dasein are the obvious access point to this ‘who’.

⁴⁹ Mulhall, 2005a, 297; 2005b, 110.

⁵⁰ Mulhall, 2005b, 110; cf. MacAvoy, 2001, 467f.

⁵¹ Blattner, 2006, 127.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 139. Dreyfus holds a similar view: MacAvoy, 2001.

vides additional support for his Dreyfusian interpretation of Division I as an account of the self-constitution of Dasein on the basis of socially instituted meaning.⁵³ Moreover, to argue that Heidegger simply misplaced anxiety in BT is a highly tendentious claim and it is difficult to see how this could be the case, especially in light of Heidegger's comments on the role of anxiety in accounting for the wholeness of Dasein and thus of the self—a central task for his fundamental ontology. For Blattner, however, it is of secondary importance that Heidegger intended BT to contribute to a general ontology: “at its core Heidegger's enterprise is explanatory.”⁵⁴ That is, BT is primarily an exploration of a phenomenology of specifically human life and the transformations in it that are possible.⁵⁵ While this *ontic* project is something Heidegger does undertake, Blattner's emphasis on explanation occludes the project of a fundamental ontology of Dasein: the relevance of fundamental ontology, according to Blattner, is confined almost exclusively to Division I.⁵⁶

This seems implausible. Heidegger certainly believes that, to date, philosophy has overlooked the philosophical significance of that which is closest to us, namely, our embodied, mindful existence or being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, we have deployed concepts which comprise our philosophical inheritance without first appreciating how this tradition has been influenced at decisive stages in its evolution and history by assumptions that have led to distorted accounts of our own subjectivity and selfhood (§6). This is due to our passing over the question of Being, and failure to see the serious, non-empty question concerning the *differential* interpretability of formal ontological notions (as Aristotle inchoately appreciated when he spoke of the many ways in which being can be said: see PIK, H13–15).⁵⁷ According to Heidegger, this failure to see that there is a serious

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Blattner, 1999, 19.

⁵⁵ Blattner, 2006, 13; c.f. Blattner, 1999, xvi, 2n2; against this Carman, 2000, 312.

⁵⁶ Blattner, 2006, 127.

⁵⁷ See Christensen 1999.

philosophical issue here has led to the traditional orientation towards construing *knowing* and *theorising* as the primary accomplishment and distinctive feature of Dasein. This has in turn led us to regard epistemological problems such as the refutation of scepticism as central and as a result, reflection on self and subjectivity has been truncated (§42). The task, therefore, of Heidegger's phenomenological ontology is to correct these truncations. *This reveals (a) a genuine philosophical task: to get the self and subject properly into view, one must acknowledge that formal ontological notions apply to the self in a way distinctive to its Being—Existenz.; and (b) that Dasein is in this way distinctive: it, precisely as the entity that can think, "I am," is, first and foremost the entity responsible for the differential applications or schematisations of formal ontological notions.* Starting from our everyday engagement with entities within the world—precisely that engagement in which it applies formal ontological notions, the ontological structures underpinning this engagement need to be disclosed in a manner which is sensitive to the distinctive character of Dasein (§5). This is the preparatory fundamental ontology of BT.

It is therefore crucial that Heidegger's analysis be seen as moving towards "the possibility of disclosing an even more primordial and universal horizon" for ontology *as such*. BT cannot be understood in a manner which restricts it to an exploration or explanation of merely ontic phenomena. To do so would be to restrict it to a *particular kind* of entity capable of thinking, "I am," of applying formal ontological notions within the horizon of time and, last but not least, raising the question of Being. It follows immediately from this that BT cannot be interpreted in a fashion which restricts the ontological structures and characters of Dasein to entities which could only exist in late or post-modernity, for example, after the "death of God." With this, we observe a crucial limitation to any popularly existentialist interpretation of Heidegger.⁵⁸ Unfortunately, it is a limitation which one which afflicts, albeit differently, the Dreyfus school, and Blatter shows himself to be susceptible to this when he interprets Heidegger's project as explaining human life. It is not surprising, then, than on the basis of this misunderstanding he finds Heidegger's

⁵⁸ Described by Aho, 2003.

characterisations of Dasein too metaphysical to be plausible.⁵⁹ In fact, these characterisations are not metaphysical but *ontological*: metaphysics, as the study of distinctively *ultimate* principles and *first* causes, is not simply identical with ontology, as the study of entities *qua* entities (and for Heidegger of Being itself). This needs to be understood if we are to understand what Heidegger is trying to do.

Over the course of this chapter, we have implicitly garnered some conditions which any adequate interpretation of anxiety must fulfil. Firstly, an interpretation of anxiety must take seriously the role of fundamental ontology. Although based in the ontic as the departure point for all phenomenological reflection,⁶⁰ anxiety must nonetheless be interpreted as ontological. Secondly and consequently, an adequate interpretation cannot merely apply itself to contemporaneous Dasein. Rather, it will apply to all Dasein and, in particular, as I shall show in Chapter Three, to such Dasein as Martin Luther. Thirdly, any adequate interpretation will take seriously the role Heidegger accords to anxiety in showing the unity of Dasein; and for an interpretation to satisfy this requirement, it must interpret anxiety in such a way that it points to there being a sense of self beyond the one-self. Only an interpretation which satisfies all these conditions will permit us to see BT, and not just Division I, as a coherent text.

⁵⁹ See Blattner, 2000; 2007. This can be extended to Dreyfus: See MacAvoy, 2001, 474f.

⁶⁰ “The roots of the existential analytic ... are ultimately existentiell, that is to say, ontical” (H13–14).

II. A closer analysis of §40: How anxiety points beyond das Man and the 'Dreyfus School'

Having addressed the broad issues of interpreting anxiety ontologically and of the role Heidegger gives it in accounting for the wholeness of Dasein, I now turn to address how these issues relate to the account of anxiety in §40 more specifically. Thus, in this chapter, I clarify why we need to view anxiety in the ontological sense as phenomenologically revealing the reason that Dasein cannot be a self merely in the sense of the one-self: this is necessary both for making sense of the very possibility of anxiety in the ontological sense and for giving an adequate account of Heidegger's overall project. The neo-Wittgensteinian and neo-social-behaviourist approach taken by Blattner and Dreyfus leads them, ultimately, to deny the seriousness or coherence of Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology in BT as a whole. Bracken has shown that Dreyfus's reading of anxiety does this implicitly if it is taken to its logical conclusion;⁶¹ Blattner openly acknowledges this consequence.⁶² Heidegger's project can be salvaged, however. To illustrate how, we need an account of anxiety that shows it to be not as Blattner and Dreyfus describe it, and which demonstrates how anxiety itself points to the inaccuracy of the neo-Wittgensteinian and neo-social-behaviourist approach.

Anxiety and World

In anxiety the assurance of the 'One' and its everyday publicness, its obviousness in which we are generally absorbed, collapses (H189). Precisely because anxiety is not anchored in- or within-the-world, because it has no definite, i.e., particular object at a point in space and time, Dasein faces in anxiety its character as being-towards its ownmost

⁶¹ Bracken, 2005.

⁶² Blattner, 1999.

ability-to-be, in which it is brought before the authenticity of its Being as a possibility for which it is always free (H187–8). Anxiety is removed from definite, factual possibilities, and turned towards possibility itself (H188). *Because of anxiety,*

The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, and neither can the Co-Dasein of Others. Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publically interpreted. (H187, translation amended by Carleton Christensen, 2012)

In the extreme form of anxiety which Heidegger intends in §40, Dasein finds itself unable to understand itself in terms of the ‘world’. The world, and all involvements with what is uncovered within it, are “of no consequence” (H186). As Heidegger makes clear, this does not mean that things disappear as such—this would be clearly absurd. Nor indeed does he mean that what is lost is the significance things objectively possess for Dasein insofar as it is engaged with the world (as it, when anxiety-stricken, is not). “The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the nothing and nowhere does not signify the absence of world” (H187). Blattner rightly points out that since Dasein’s Being is always an issue for it (§§9, 12), in anxiety I still understand the relevance of everything I encounter within-the-world, but it no longer seems relevant to *me*.⁶³ Things have lost their significance for Dasein merely in the sense of being no longer able to motivate as per their significance. And precisely for this reason, the world is all the more *simply* there: that the world is and that it takes its course indifferently to the individual, in *objective freedom from the value Dasein places upon the things and possibilities within it*, becomes phenomenologically evident in anxiety (H187).

The way Heidegger sometimes talks about anxiety seems to cast it as a fundamentally dislocated phenomenon⁶⁴—for instance, “fear is anxiety fallen into the ‘world,’ inauthen-

⁶³ Blattner, 2006, 41.

⁶⁴ Berthold-Bond, 1991, 125–7.

tic, and, as such, hidden from itself,” (H189). This suggests that anxiety is in some sense, ‘above’ the world. But Dasein is never literally detached or separated from the world. All Heidegger means is simply that in anxiety the motivational force of the significances, which would normally impel Dasein, have fallen away. In this sense, and this sense alone, Dasein can no longer move about the world. Only in this sense is anxious Dasein accurately characterised as “floating unattached.”⁶⁵ We need to remember that Heidegger has defined Being-in ‘(-the-world)’ as ‘residing together with’ in opposition to mere ‘inside-ness’ (see H54–5). This commitment to Dasein’s Being-in-the-world prevents Heidegger from sharing any Kierkegaardian or Nietzschean exaltation of isolation.⁶⁶ Hence, in anxiety, Dasein is not *at home* in the world, and experiences itself as such (H188). This uncanniness (*Unheimlichkeit*) reveals Dasein to itself as an individual in its pure particularity: Dasein is revealed to itself as existing, but existing now *not* as actively and interestedly engaged in-the-world as it usually is.⁶⁷ And yet, it still is. Dasein is thus revealed to itself as more than simply an acting-out of social roles: it is revealed to itself as a “*solus ipse*,” that is, in its capacity as a pure (self-)consciousness (H188). Anxiety, then, is the basis upon which one can have an awareness of oneself as a ‘thinking thing’—an impartial, disinterested pure ego—and similarly, of the world as objective, proceeding indifferently to one.

Yet while Heidegger tells us that “[a]nxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as ‘*solus ipse*,’” he immediately qualifies this:

[T]his existential ‘solipsism’ is so far from the displacement of putting an isolated subject-Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the- world. (H188)

⁶⁵ Ibid., 126.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Personal Communication, Carleton Christensen, 2012.

The experience of anxiety, for Heidegger, would thus seem to underpin absurdity in Camus's sense or nausea in Sartre's. In anxiety, one suffers not because of something at hand and objectively present but because everything has nothing more to 'say' to us (H343). When Heidegger tells us that in anxiety, no worldly entity is "relevant," he means in part that—in contrast to fear—there is no worldly entity or thing which we might point to as the source of our anxiety, and neither is there any such worldly being that might provide solace. The world appears precisely as somewhere in which we cannot be, or can be no longer, at home—but it still appears as the world. Consequently, anxiety, as Heidegger understands it, does not disclose Dasein in terms of its particular engagements in the world, but as individualised; as more than this character as worldly engagement. This is precisely why anxiety is of phenomenological importance to the discussion of Dasein and its being-a-self (*Selbstsein*): the very possibility of anxiety attests phenomenologically to Dasein as being more than a one-self.⁶⁸ If Dasein were nothing more than this, then, *pace* Dreyfus and Blattner, it could not exist as anxious, for it would be nothing more than an engaging with its world.

'Solus Ipse'

Because it is unable to identify motivating significance in the world, *anxious Dasein* is *thrown back completely upon itself* (H187–8). For Dreyfus and Rubin (D&R), this means that in anxiety "the self is annihilated. There is only anxiousness."⁶⁹ Dasein is therefore, according to D&R, even at its most primordial level, a purely social creature imbued with a mere *sense* of individual concrete content—a sense which is overcome in authenticity to the detriment of any pre-philosophical sense of self and identity.⁷⁰ Note the effect of this: D&R render what Heidegger regards as Dasein's *inauthentic* existence as the state in

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ D&R, 304.

⁷⁰ Against this see Brogan, 2005, 150f.; Bracken, 2005, 535; MacAvoy, 2001.

which it is most truly (*eigentlich*) self-like, viz., authentic.⁷¹ Dasein is presented as a transient, socially constructed Being with no identity beyond its being the point of mediation between, and enactment of, such and such factual social roles.

But, as Bracken argues, if anxiety discloses the meaningless emptiness of Being, the possibility that anything could matter to authentic Dasein, such that it might find the motivation to take up any of its possibilities, is precluded.⁷² Motivation requires mattering; but as this sort of ‘nothing’, Dasein can only *ever* be a passive vessel: and, indeed, this is precisely what Blattner maintains is its consequence.⁷³ Implicit in Bracken’s critique is that D&R’s reading of anxiety entails that the experience of extreme anxiety would prevent Dasein from returning to—from being able to *be*—Being-in-the-world. In other words, it would cease to be Dasein. Authentic Dasein is here at best a vessel which, in recalling its moments of anxiety, puts the nihilism of everything into perspective, allowing it to choose which past possibilities of Being to model its life upon. The outcome of this interpretation is thus, at its worst, that there is nothing left for Heidegger to rationally discuss in Division II.⁷⁴

For D&R, then, fundamental unity must come either from *das Man* or through a will out of nothing.⁷⁵ D&R are right to distance Heidegger from the latter account of authentic Dasein, in its nihilist nothingness, as giving itself its own individual purpose and meaning out of pure possibility (in a sort of ‘Nietzschean’ overcoming through blood and steel)⁷⁶. And they do so, quite consistently, on the grounds that given their interpretation there can be no Dasein to be found in anxiety on which to ground an account of authentic Dasein. But this is, as intimated in Chapter One, a misinterpretation of Heidegger’s pro-

⁷¹ Personal communication, Carleton Christensen, 2010.

⁷² Bracken, 2005, 540.

⁷³ Blattner, 1999, 87–8.

⁷⁴ Bracken, 2005,

⁷⁵ D&R, 301, 312–3.

⁷⁶ Young, 1998, 81–2.

ject. Their neo-Wittgensteinian approach leads them into what Chapter Three will show to be a false dichotomy: that we must understand anxiety *either* as showing us ‘nothing’, from which we can only find refuge by falling back into the One, *or* as showing us a radical way to construct our own meaning. And they do so, quite consistently, on the grounds that there can be no Dasein to be found in anxiety on which to ground an account of authentic Dasein. But this is, as intimated in Chapter One, a misinterpretation of Heidegger’s project. Their neo-Wittgensteinian approach leads them into what Chapter Three will show to be a false dichotomy: that we must understand anxiety *either* as showing us ‘nothing’, from which we can only find refuge by falling back into the One, *or* as showing us a radical way to construct our own meaning. Thus, this reading *presupposes* Nietzsche’s “God is dead,” *and* the absence of any guarantee that one is able to act meaningfully on one’s values, on this basis—hence, coherence must be rescued from this meaninglessness. Thus, not only is their reading textually and possibly internally incoherent, it is in principle and in method unable to admit an ontological account of the unity of Dasein.

Blattner’s account recognises some of these inconsistencies.⁷⁷ Whereas for D&R “the self is annihilated”⁷⁸ in anxiety, Blattner insists that “Dasein is able to be, even though it cannot constitute itself as anyone.”⁷⁹ Blattner explains this by differentiating between “thick” and “thin” notions of existentiality. In the thin sense, “we always stand before the question, Who am I?” which we answer in the thick sense by “carrying on our lives in a determinate way, thereby taking a stand on who we are, making or constituting ourselves in the process.”⁸⁰ Blattner holds that in anxiety these come apart such that “we stand before the question, Who am I? but we cannot answer it.”⁸¹ As such, when Heidegger tells

⁷⁷ See Blattner, 2006, 154

⁷⁸ D&R, 304.

⁷⁹ Blattner, 2006, 140.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 144; c.f. 1994, 62–3.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

us that anxiety individualises us and brings us face-to-face with our ownmost ability-to-be (H188), Blattner understands this merely in a thin sense of being “most your own.”⁸² While there is a reading of this based on a romantic concept of authenticity as self-ownership, Blattner rejects this: “anxiety does not disclose ‘who we really are,’ because in anxiety we are no one.”⁸³ Blattner also rejects the Sartrean existentialist interpretation that “in anxiety we realize the “deep truth” about our lives, that everything is worthless or meaningless.”⁸⁴ On this basis, Blattner concludes that anxiety is *merely* the disclosure that *how* Dasein is as Being-possible, which requires public interpretation.⁸⁵ Anxiety is a disclosure of the *kind* of entity we can be as individualised: we are merely being-possible, without being also able to make or constitute ourselves; without being able to take a stand, we have no determinate life.⁸⁶

Blattner is right to resist romantic and popularly existentialist interpretations of anxiety, insisting that anxiety is “a kind of breakdown experience, breakdown in the living of a human life, rather than a window onto the truth.”⁸⁷ However what he concludes that it must be instead is, I argue, false. As we have seen, for Blattner and D&R, anxiety discloses the ultimate meaninglessness and insignificance of everything beyond Dasein’s relation to the normative social practices of the day.⁸⁸ It seems that, for Blattner, once the romantic and existentialist readings have been rejected, there is no other way left to account for what anxiety is beyond understanding it as our recognition that we are entirely bound to our social practices. But this account cannot connect anxiety in the ontological sense and anxiety in the everyday, ontic sense in a way that is any more than

⁸² *Ibid.*, 152.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 144.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 143-4, 152, 156.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 144.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 139.

⁸⁸ See Boedecker, 2001; Bracken, 2005.

merely arbitrary—he can only associate it with the ontic phenomena it seems closest to, depression, as something which *explains* it in some way.

Evidently, a different account is needed. I propose, then, the following: In anxiety the world loses significance such that its motivational structure is still present to, but unable to actually move, Dasein. Moreover, Dasein can get itself into this state as a result of what it inherently is. Consequently, Dasein always has an anticipatory awareness of this essential possibility, at least in the sense that *when* it strikes, Dasein recognises it as something that had been looming. Furthermore, it implicates an awareness of self as *disinterested*.⁸⁹ This becomes evident precisely when one reflects upon what it means for all the significances of the world to fall away: anxiety *singularises*, it *individualises*, in that it imparts a sense of ‘I’ which incorporates recognition that I am not entirely bound to these significances as they are currently showing them to me. The fact that Dasein can be in this state at all simultaneously shows the phenomenologist that response to motivations and relevancies (as determined by Dasein’s existence in what Dreyfus and Blattner term social practices) does not exhaust it.⁹⁰ That is, in anxiety, Dasein reveals itself to *the phenomenologist* to be more than a one-self, with this particular socially and historically conditioned set of beliefs, desires, affectivities and behavioural dispositions.⁹¹ In short, anxiety shows the phenomenologist the possibility of a radical kind of alienation from all that one actually is: Dasein can be radically otherwise than it currently is while remaining self-same—an important point which I argue in Chapter 3. Dasein transcends that set of actual commitments it has as one-self existing in relation to its particular One.

If this is correct, then the paralysis (or anticipation thereof) experienced in anxiety is a phenomenological clue to the fact that the self does not exhaust itself in its “average everydayness” (H181; cf. H188–9). Dasein must be more than simply a coordinating of diverse

⁸⁹ Personal communication, Carleton Christensen, 2012.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

social roles, for only so can it exist in the incoherent impasse of anxiety.⁹² It is this which Heidegger means when he says that Dasein is something to be ‘projected into’, or ‘held out into’, the ‘nothing’ of anxiety (WM, H12). Consequently, *contra* D&R, while what is revealed in anxiety is ‘no-thing’, this does not mean that Dasein is ultimately ‘null’. This is why Heidegger says that anxiety “brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for ... the authenticity of its Being” (H188). It is here, in this uncanny space where Dasein’s everyday “at-homeness” in the world is under threat from the “more primordial phenomenon” of Dasein’s fundamental “not-at-home,” that Dasein is able to glimpse its authentic potentiality-for-being (H189). With this, we can begin to see how anxiety might contribute to the wholeness of Dasein and the self, and thereby to the overall coherence of BT.

Beyond das Man: the need for Division II

I have argued that to understand BT coherently we must move beyond the everyday, generic self. This is confirmed by the crucial methodological role played by authenticity in BT. Here, there are two notions of self of equal ontological importance: the ‘inauthentic’ one-self and the ‘authentic’ self. While some interpreters hold that these notions are incoherent,⁹³ I view these notions as capturing different but complementary modes of the Being, of the self *as such*.⁹⁴ The primacy of the one-self is temporal: one must be this *initially* (and indeed for the most part).⁹⁵ But this is only a side or partial aspect of selfhood. But the authentic self is the *primordial* or *original* self in the sense that it is this notion towards explicating which any adequate account of the self—any account permitting us to

⁹² *Ibid.*, Cf. Bracken 2005.

⁹³ Olafson, for example, prioritizes authenticity (Division II) to the detriment of inauthenticity (Division I); while Dreyfus does the opposite. See, e.g. Boedecker, 2001.

⁹⁴ Boedecker, 2001.

⁹⁵ Russell, 2008, 109.

non-trivially address the question of Being—must be oriented (H310).⁹⁶ It is the authentic self that a fundamental ontology of the self must aim to reveal so as to give an adequate ontology of the self *as such* (H188). This is why Heidegger tells us at the start of Division II:

[O]ur existential analysis of Dasein up till now cannot lay claim to primordially. Its fore-having never included more than the inauthentic Being of Dasein, and of Dasein as less than a whole [als unganzes]. If the Interpretation of Dasein's Being is to become primordial, as a foundation for working out the basic question of ontology, then it must first be brought to light existentially the Being of Dasein in its possibilities of authenticity and totality. (H233, emphasis original)

Heidegger's analysis thus far has certainly been existential and, therefore, ontological. But there is no contradiction when, at the beginning of Division II, Heidegger says that his analysis has not uncovered what Dasein is *primordially*. Despite the fact that I need not always be such a self—and indeed one cannot be this self initially—there is a mode of self that is ontologically more primordial than the one-self in the sense that it is an ideal or optimal condition which we must explicate if we are at all to have a truly adequate grasp of Dasein's wholeness, beyond that which is possible in Division I.

By way of concluding this chapter let us reiterate one important result: Heidegger's account of anxiety is not to be read as part of a (popular-) existentialist thesis on the need to forge meaning for ourselves in the face of a groundless, disenchanted void.⁹⁷ In order now to demonstrate this, and to concretise further the abstract account of anxiety given

⁹⁶ See Crowe, 2006, 29; cf. MacAvoy, 2001, 472.

⁹⁷ See Aho, 2003.

here, let us turn now to an example of what Heidegger means by anxiety which clearly predates any such disenchanting existence: Martin Luther.

III. Interpreting anxiety through Luther

This chapter explores one possibility of what an alternative interpretation of anxiety to that offered by the Dreyfus School might look like. Here, I use Luther to give a reading of anxiety fulfilling the criteria set out in Chapter One and elaborated in Chapter Two.⁹⁸ Firstly, I demonstrate how reading Heidegger's anxiety in tandem with Luther's tribulations or *Anfechtungen* allows us to give an account of anxiety's ontological basis as a possibility in the core of Dasein's Being. I then explore the parallels between anxiety in BT and Luther's writings on sin and *destructio*: while anxiety may be considered as radical incoherence, it is not Dasein's annihilation but rather a tendency toward self-dissolution. Finally, I show how this reading can be extended to Heidegger's discussion of anxiety in the face of death in Division II to provide an account of the wholeness of Dasein, allowing room for Heidegger's account of authenticity.

In Chapter One I claimed that everyday anxiety provides a clue as to the structure of anxiety in the ontological sense. Not failing the exam was important to the student because not failing *mattered* to him or her—*mattered* relative to the student's axiologically laden sense or understanding of who or what he or she would ideally be. Anxiety in the ontological sense is a radicalised version of this condition—radicalised in the sense that who and what Dasein would ideally be is such that Dasein is not able to be factually in the world as who or what it would ideally be. In other words, its basic structure is a radical incoherence between Dasein's character as factually being in the world and how it would ideally be in it, such that these two aspects are mutually exclusive.

⁹⁸ I owe this interpretation to my discussions with Carleton Christensen, 2011-12; see also Christensen, 2008.

Anxiety in this sense may be demonstrated using the example of Luther and those tribulations (*Anfechtungen*) which led him ultimately to reform the Catholic doctrine of salvation. It is worth commenting first on the relevance of this example. It is well documented how decisive Heidegger's encounter with Luther in the early 1920s was in shaping the contours of his thought.⁹⁹ There is considerable justification for interpreting Luther's life as exemplifying the type of anxiety Heidegger intends in §40,¹⁰⁰ even though Luther himself is not directly analysed in BT. For instance, Heidegger notes Luther's work in connection with the phenomenon of anxiety (H190N4),¹⁰¹ and according to Van Buren, "Heidegger studied closely here the treatment of the 'fall,' 'care,' 'anxiety,' 'death,' 'flight,' and 'conscience,'" in passages "from Luther's *Lecture on Romans*, in his *Heidelberg Disputation*, and in his *Commentary on Genesis*, Chapter 3."¹⁰² Further, Edmund Schlink maintained that "Heidegger's existential analytic of human Dasein is a radical secularization of Luther's anthropology."¹⁰³

Luther's crisis of certainty

While returning to his studies in Erfurt in 1505, Luther was caught in a thunderstorm, and, so the story goes,¹⁰⁴ lightning struck the ground in front of him. In mortal terror he cried out to Saint Anne, "I will become a monk!" Luther was as good as his word: shortly thereafter, he joined the Augustinian Hermits to relieve, what Boehmer already describes as his anxiety.¹⁰⁵ Luther had been plagued by doubts, fears, and demons all his life,¹⁰⁶ and

⁹⁹ See Van Buren 1994a; 1994b; Kisiel, 1995; Crowe, 2006.

¹⁰⁰ Personal communication, Carleton Christensen, 2011-12; see Christensen, 2008.

¹⁰¹ Crowe, 2006, 41-2.

¹⁰² Van Buren, 1994a, 170.

¹⁰³ Quoted in and translated from the German by van Buren, 1993, 139; 1994a, 159.

¹⁰⁴ Boehmer, 1960, 33-4; Bainton, 1970, 34-5.

¹⁰⁵ Boehmer, 1960, 33-5.

¹⁰⁶ Boehmer, 1960, *passim*; Lau, 1963, *passim*; Bainton, 1970, esp. 2-8.

that year he had apparently been experiencing intense anxiety over his sins and fear of the Last Judgement.¹⁰⁷ The event of the lightning strike, overwhelmed Luther because it simultaneously brought into relief his faith and his worldly existence. Luther felt that he was not truly living as a man of faith; he was distracted and unsure about the path to salvation.¹⁰⁸ This background explains why the almost fatal lightning strike could elicit in Luther both the resolve to become a monk, and the dedication with which Luther gave himself over to pursuing his newfound devotion.¹⁰⁹

Despite fulfilling his vows as a monk, however, Luther's anxieties remained.¹¹⁰ No matter what he did by way of prayer, fasting and self-denial, he could not be certain whether he was worthy of salvation, consistently finding himself and his life wanting.¹¹¹ Catholicism teaches that salvation and God's love must be earned through good works and good intentions. Luther, however, was never certain that what he thought were good works really were so, since he could never be certain of their consequences and whether or not he had done enough to avoid negative consequences. Nor could he be sure that what he thought were good intentions, were actually so.¹¹² For Luther, any act or intention could turn out to be, secretly, sinful. So desperate was Luther to avoid sin that he apparently took to his bed in order not to do anything at all—only to realise that this too was an act in itself. And so, Luther found himself in a situation where, *for all possible actions A, he can do neither A nor not-A*—in effect, a collapse of his ability to be a rational will. In his despair, Luther came to wonder whether it was not God but Satan who called him to the cloister¹¹³—surely such trials could only be inflicted by Satan! With this, Luther hurled

¹⁰⁷ Boehmer, 1960, 32; Bainton, 1970, 30.

¹⁰⁸ See Boehmer, 1960, Ch.s 1-3; Bainton, 1970, Ch. 1.

¹⁰⁹ Boehmer, 1960, 87.

¹¹⁰ See Bainton, 1970, 55-9; Boehmer, 1960, 87-110.

¹¹¹ Lau, 1963, 54-6; Scaer, 1983, 26.

¹¹² Bainton, 1970, 56.

¹¹³ Bainton, 1970, 44; Scaer, 1983.

his inkpot against the wall of his cell, only to realise that he had committed the greatest sin of all: rebellion against God.

There are two important characteristics distinguishing Luther's crisis: firstly, it was a crisis of certainty, leading to the immobilisation of Luther *qua* rational will. Secondly, this crisis derived from Luther's understanding of what it was to be a good Christian worthy of salvation. Crucial to this understanding was the assumption that salvation could be earned, and, therefore, could be rationally obtained through accordant actions. Luther's serious and conscientious attempts to realise salvation, thus understood, led him to a crisis in which his very capacity to will collapsed. Luther undermined his own existence as a self-conscious, willing agent; through the exercise of his rational will he tended to dissolution as a rational will.

This situation is the key to understanding anxiety as described in §40. Anxiety is the possibility inherent in Dasein's being of finding oneself in a situation in which, in virtue of seeking consistently and conscientious to implement one's understanding of who and what one would ideally be, e.g., in Luther's case, a good Christian as he understood this, one is not able-to-be in the world (as one would ideally be). The possibility of finding oneself in this kind of crisis situation emerges precisely from the way that Dasein is in the world: in its structure as ability-to-be. For this reason, Dasein is also always latently aware of this situation as a possibility inherent to it, at least in the sense that *when* it arises or is imminent, Dasein recognises it as something which has always already loomed. In this sense, Dasein is always already anxious. In short, it is built into the very ontological constitution of Dasein precisely as an entity capable of the "I am," or perhaps more precisely, "I am as willing," that it can find itself in, or on its way towards, a situation in which for all possible actions A, it cannot rationally do (will) either A or not-A.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ Anxiety in this sense bears some similarity (and some significant difference) to the radical boredom Heidegger describes in *FCM* as another kind of basic affective disposedness alongside anxiety. In radical boredom one is aware of oneself as neither *wanting* to do A nor *wanting* to do not-A (Personal communication, Carleton Christensen, 2012).

One experiences oneself as being immobilised, as being unable to act or *to will*—or at least on one’s way toward being so, which Luther precisely illustrates. Luther’s *Anfechtungen*—variously translated as “trials”, “tribulations”, “temptations”, and “afflictions”¹¹⁵—are emblematic of both his *theologia crucis* and his life.¹¹⁶ *Anfechtungen* are assaults of doubt, despair and anxiety about one’s good standing before God—that good standing which for Luther marks a life out as actually (*eigentlich*) Christian.¹¹⁷ Caught within his *Anfechtungen*, Luther lost all ability to discriminate between possible courses of action, and thus to decide upon, i.e. *to will*, any actions—despite knowing he must. As Crowe puts it, his “[m]ere natural knowledge of God, attained through reason, collapses in the face of the onslaught of *Anfechtung*.”¹¹⁸ Luther experienced a collapse of his ability-to-be (*Seinkönnen*)—to which I now turn.

Seinkönnen

Heidegger’s term ‘ability-to-be (*Seinkönnen*)’¹¹⁹ is meant to articulate the idea that Dasein is in-the-world as “primarily Being-possible” (H143). As indicated in Chapter One, it captures Dasein’s factual character as always being *to some extent or other*, as this is determined by the circumstances, what it *can be*¹²⁰ in one’s circumstances, as the individual it is. And what it can be, as the individual it is, is precisely who and what it *would ideally be* (see §§ 31–32, as well as §41). Luther, for instance, saw himself ideally as a good Christian, living saved in the sight of God; but equally knew himself as being factually a less than adequate instance of this. This kind of disconnect between one’s ideal self and one’s facti-

¹¹⁵ See Scaer, 1983, 15; Clifton-Soderstrom, 2009, 182: as each translation captures only a part of the meaning of *Anfechtung* as a theological concept, I leave this term untranslated.

¹¹⁶ Clifton-Soderstrom, 2009, 182.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*; Strohl, 2003, 150; cf. Lau, 1963, 55.

¹¹⁸ Crowe, 2006, 57.

¹¹⁹ Translation chosen on personal communication, Carleton Christensen, 2012.

¹²⁰ See Kisiel, 1995, 504. Kisiel translates *Seinkönnen* as ‘can-be’.

cal self is, of course, hardly restricted to such extreme cases as Luther. We all have goals and desires which for whatever reason we may not be factually able to actualise. The point here is that ability-to-be is how Dasein factually is in-the-world, namely, as essentially relational, as relating itself—while being to some extent distant from itself—to itself (as it would ideally be). Dasein thus is as oriented towards itself as it would ideally be. Just this is what Heidegger is getting at when he characterises the structural wholeness of Dasein as *care*—as “Being-ahead-of-oneself-in-Being-already- in ...-as Being-alongside” (H196). Dasein is an always already going-to-be (always already on its way to be). Dasein comports itself toward its Being precisely because its Being—who and what it is, both now and in the future—is an issue for it, both in the sense of mattering to it *and* in the sense of being a question whose answer it must continually negotiate with the situation (§9, §12; §4). For both these reasons, Dasein is essentially a pressing forward into its *genuine*, non-abstract possibilities of action, *viz.* those which matter to it (§32), and in this way Dasein equiprimordially realises and clarifies itself to itself. In this sense, it is as ‘projecting’ (*entwerfen*) its Being onto its possibilities (§ 31–2). As such, almost by definition, anxiety, because it immobilises, threatens Dasein in its very Being.

Heidegger tells us that any Dasein is for-the-sake-of its ‘ownmost ability-to-Be (*eigenstes Seinkönnen*)’ (H192). Here, the superlative ‘ownmost’ emphasises the fact that *each* Dasein, as it factually is, is oriented towards some notion of who or what it would ideally be *as the particular individual* instance it is of Dasein. Dasein is being ‘ahead’ or ‘beyond’ itself (H192) in such a way that it has “already compared itself ... with a possibility of itself” (H191). This is an affectively-charged understanding of one-self, axiologically and also *mattering* to one; as such, it constitutes a sense of self-worth.¹²¹ Because pressing forward into possibilities both clarifies and shapes Dasein’s self-understanding, Dasein’s ownmost ability-to-be is inevitably influenced by *das Man*; every Dasein is, after all, inauthentic “proximally and for the most part” (H193). Even so, even when Dasein’s understanding of who and what it would ideally be is simply acquired from *das Man*, we can

¹²¹ Personal communication, Carleton Christensen, 2012.

still speak of its ownmost (*eigenstes*) ability-to-be in the sense defined.¹²² Thus “anxiety,” as Heidegger tells us, “makes manifest in Dasein its *Being towards* its ownmost ability-to-be.” (H188, emphasis original).

Radical incoherence between one’s ownmost and factual ability-to-be

In anxiety, or perhaps rather in the state of anxiousness preceding extreme or full-blown anxiety, Dasein anticipates a radical incoherence between how it is factually able to be in the world and how it would ideally be in it, such that these aspects are mutually exclusive. Moreover, this radical incoherence is an *existential possibility* of Dasein. For certain (clearly ontic) understandings of itself as it would ideally be, Dasein’s *consistent and conscientious, rational pursuit* of its ownmost ability-to-be constitutes a slide towards this radical incoherence.

In this regard, Luther’s crisis of certainty is paradigmatic. Luther saw himself ideally as worthy of salvation—but he understood this through the Catholic doctrine of salvation as something to be earned, and hence acquired through one’s own rational will and effort. Luther pursued this task with consistency and vigour to the point of doubting his faith and God, leading him into stalemate and collapse. Most people merely anticipate this kind of existentially significant uncertainty: generally we are only inchoately aware of it, and most of us brush away such uncertainties as ‘just nothing’ (H189; cf. §52). Here one might say, as Staupitz did to Luther, that God could not have possibly meant salvation to be this difficult.¹²³ In this sense, Luther was exemplary: he was not merely anxious but positively placed himself in anxiety’s way, i.e., he endured it explicitly and self-consciously *for the sake of* his ownmost ability-to-be (§40).

Importantly, Luther’s situation was more than a mere momentary impasse. *It nearly destroyed him; he nearly ‘died’ as self.* The consistent, rational pursuit of existence as a man of faith led him into a situation in which he literally could not be as an ability-to-be, in the

¹²² To this extent, we must distinguish ‘ownmost’ from ‘authentic’ (*eigentliches*) ability-to-be.

¹²³ Lau, 1963, 59–60; Boemher, 1970, 53–4.

world: in his anxiety he confronts the impossibility of his own being (as a good Catholic). Everything that allowed him to make sense of his life—to make sense of the world, his actions in it, the way he comports himself towards it and hence towards himself—is shown, in his anxiety, to be radically incoherent. In this state, his ability-to-be (in-the-world) is so to speak existentially falsified. Crucially, a certain inversion is possible here: Luther’s anxiety only makes sense insofar as both being in the world as he would ideally be and simply being factually in the world matter to him. So just as Luther may be said to have suffered anxiety *for* his ownmost ability-to-be as a good Christian *in the face of* his (corrupt and sinful) factual being-in-the-world, so, too, he can be said to have suffered anxiety *for* his being-in-the-world as such *in the face of* his ownmost ability to be. In order to factually *be* in the world, he cannot take seriously his ownmost ability-to-be in the world, i.e. his ideals, *and vice versa*.

This points to the need to undertake a slight correction of Heidegger’s characterisation of the structure displayed by anxiety. Heidegger tells us in §40 that Dasein is anxious *in the face of* Being-in-the-world as such; and *for the sake of* or *about* variously its ownmost Being-in-the-world (H187,8) or its authentic ability-to-be(-in-the-world). In §41 he tells us “that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world; that which we have anxiety about is our ability-to-be-in-the-world” (H191, translation amended). Evidently, it would be more consistent to understand these as *interchangeable* rather than, as Heidegger says at H188, “selfsame,” i.e. identical—and indeed Heidegger then talks of anxiety in the face of death as anxiety in the face of one’s *uttermost* ownmost ability-to-be. Anxiety, then, in the sense Heidegger intends has more of a symmetrical structure rather than a reflexive one: like Luther, one is anxious, not for the sake of *x* in the face of *x*, but rather both for the sake of *x* in the face of *y* *and* for the sake of *y* in the face of *x*. Dasein is anxious about its thrown ability-to-be in the world for the sake of its ownmost ability-to-be but conversely, it is anxious about its ownmost ability-to-be for the sake of its thrown ability-to-be in the world.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ Personal communication, Carleton Christensen, 2011–2012.

Read in this way, anxiety is a tending towards an *incoherence* rather than an *absence* of the standard one has for one's own being. Precisely for this reason, it explains not only why according to Heidegger in anxiety one's ownmost ability-to-be matters to one (which at least Blattner arguably can do), but also why it can also be authentically one's own, which neither Blattner nor Dreyfus can. For both interpret Heidegger's claim, that in anxiety the ordinary everyday significances and meanings of the world fall away, as revealing that Dasein can have no identity or meaning beyond that which it constitutes from the set of normative social practices definitive of *das Man*.¹²⁵ Consequently, D&R consistently conclude that "Dasein has no possibilities of its own and that it can never acquire any."¹²⁶ Heidegger, however, clearly speaks not merely of Dasein's ownmost but also of its 'authentic' (*eigentliches*) ability to be in the world—see H187.

This entails a further incompatibility with Blattner's reading of anxiety as depression: in order to have the kind of anxiety described here, one must have something to see oneself as ideally being, something to hold on to. Depression, by contrast, is defined by the distinct *lack* of something to hold on to in this sense. So, against Blattner, we need to insist that while someone suffering from anxiety may go through depressive *moments*, as Luther clearly did, these are merely particular *ontic* phases of anxiety and not exhaustive of the kinds of phases that anxiety *can* display.

Indeed Heidegger may indeed have understood that what we today term 'depression' is the distinct *lack* of a point of orientation one might hold on to and so precisely *not* anxiety in the sense he intends: he describes fear, *in contrast to anxiety*, as a

depression (*Gedrückttheit*) ... [which] forces Dasein back to its thrownness, but in such a way that this thrownness gets quite closed off. ... one has forgotten oneself ... [Fear is] a depressed or bewildered awaiting. (H342)

Of the relationship with anxiety he then says:

¹²⁵ Against this, see: Bracken, 2005; Christensen, 2009.

¹²⁶ Dreyfus and Rubin, 1991, 305.

these two phenomena coincide. This does not mean that their structural characters are melted away into one another, as if anxiety were anxious neither in the face of anything nor about anything.” (H342–3)

Of course, Blattner’s assimilation of anxiety in Heidegger’s sense to depression fits well with his understanding of Dasein as purely constituted by social practices, and anxiety as meaning that all the significances which these practices determine are equally irrelevant and insignificant. As such, the fact that Heidegger appears to resist this assimilation suggests that Blattner’s understanding of Dasein more generally is incorrect.

Importantly, too, anxiety as just described, bears a remarkable resemblance not only to depression but to the state which Luther describes in his writings as *destructio*. Anxiety is the possibility of incoherence and dissolution in Dasein’s existence, one that results from an excess of reason. Consequently it has a certain affinity with Luther’s notion of *destructio*. But in order to see this, one must first understand Luther’s account of sin.

Sin and reason

As Heidegger is aware, the concept of sin is central to Luther’s thought. Thus, in the 1924 lecture ‘The Problem of Sin in Luther’, Heidegger describes how Luther proceeds “directly from sin” (PSL, 105)—for Luther, Heidegger tells us, “the *natura hominis* is *corrupta* [corrupt]. The being of man as such is itself sin” (108). Luther, following Paul, sees the self as chronically tempted to sin (LW32, 224), and in his *Lectures on Romans* he paints a very dark portrait of human life.¹²⁷ Crucially, our core sinfulness is pride and hubristic overestimation of ourselves: we believe ourselves to be able to exist without of God, to be able to make ourselves independent of Him—indeed, we wish to be Him (PSL, 106; see LW25, 222).¹²⁸ This creates a self-perpetuating circle of fear and flight from God: sin begets sin, and we flee in the face of sin, into more sin, and so on. Indeed for Luther, the corruption

¹²⁷ See Crowe, 2006, 48–59.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 58; personal communication, Carleton Christensen, 2012.

of human existence as sin is so complete that the depth of our sin remains out of our view, incomprehensible to us.¹²⁹

Luther's *theologia crucis* attempts to open an alternative path.¹³⁰ For Luther, God requires everything be overthrown for the sake of new creation; the corruption of human identity must be undone and a new self created (see LW25).¹³¹ So, too, for Heidegger: in the experience anxiety the phenomenologist observes that Dasein tends towards (is tempted into) falling; and that Dasein is brought "face to face with its *Being free for (propensio in...)* the authenticity of its Being" (H188). In his lectures on Luther Heidegger stresses the affective dimension to this (PSL, 106): the *experience* of the destruction of hubristic identity and attachments allows the Word to announce itself anew as something radically fresh and different. For Luther, God reveals our depravity to us through the "fire of tribulation [*per tribulationibus ignem*; 'the fire through tribulations']" (LW, 291):

[S]uffering comes, ... and takes away everything [man] has and leaves him naked and alone, allowing him no help or safety ... it makes a man ... seek help outside of himself and all other things, in God alone. (LW, 292)

Luther calls this the experience of *destructio*.¹³² Drawing on the Mystics, he describes *destructio* as an experience in which "there is no flight, no comfort, within or without, but all things accuse" (LW31, 129).¹³³ This experience is beyond intellectual doubt about faith; *destructio* is, as Crowe puts it, "experienced as a genuine demolition of everything that one has, up to that moment, identified with."¹³⁴ One is faced with the terrifying reality of one's life as a sinner before God, and of the futility and corruption of human efforts

¹²⁹ Clifton-Soderstrom, 2009, 179; see LW34, 156.

¹³⁰ Cf. Crowe, 2006, 43.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 65.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 65.

(LW31 129).¹³⁵ This distress teaches humility: it teaches the need to keep oneself small, to resist hubris of the self, which is pride in oneself, the worst of all sins since it constitutes resistance to God.¹³⁶

As Crowe argues, *destructio* is important for Heidegger, too.¹³⁷ Heidegger does not simply transpose Luther's thought into a secular context by omitting references to God; he genuinely secularises it. In his *Lectures on Romans*, Luther links theoretical reason with sin through his criticism of the "natural knowledge" of God which *theologia gloriae* purports to be able to achieve (see LW25, 10; 157). The operative word here is "natural": natural knowledge is knowledge we acquire for ourselves, through our own efforts. In our corruption, we take self-aggrandizing pride in the powers of human intellect independently to know God (LW25, 10). But God can only reveal Himself to us; the proper response to which is humility, love and worship. So, too, with practical reason: Luther's life and experience teaches that we cannot *do* anything to achieve, to earn salvation and God's love—in any case, these are already *given*. So for Luther, our original sinfulness is a tendency to hubristic overestimation of ourselves—a tendency inherent to us *qua* rational beings. Consequently, reading classical Heideggerian concepts such as inauthenticity, flight and falling in light of Luther, they become a critique of our *excessive* pride or preoccupation with public reason and knowledge.

This theme of sin appears in secularised form in Heidegger's account of everydayness.¹³⁸ Thus, in his 1921–2 Freiburg Lectures Heidegger talks about the unrest (*die Unruhe*) of everyday life leading to a ruinance (*die Ruinanz*).¹³⁹ 'Ruinanz' becomes 'be-

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹³⁶ Personal communication, Carleton Christensen, 2012.

¹³⁷ This argument is set out comprehensively in Crowe, 2006—see particularly Chapters 2, 7 and 8.

¹³⁸ See Van Buuren, 1994a.

¹³⁹ Crowe, 2006, 72.

ing fallen (*Verfallensein*)' in BT¹⁴⁰—see §38.¹⁴¹ Our flight from God and our incomprehension of our sinfulness become for Heidegger Dasein's flight in the face of itself into its everyday inauthenticity, in which it is blind to its possibility of authenticity.¹⁴² Luther notes that religious practices are often engaged in to “quiet the fears of our heart” (LW25 p. 245f.). In BT, *das Man* is a genuinely ontological structure enabling certainty—not of sin but of behaviour and motives (See Division I, Chapter 5).¹⁴³ The publicness of *das Man* provides inauthentic Dasein with an escape into the “protecting shelter” of “the obviousness and self-assurance of the average ways in which things have been interpreted” (H170). Heidegger takes up this idea as being central to inauthentic life.¹⁴⁴ For Heidegger, the pull of inauthenticity lies in its being the path of least resistance.

Interpreting Dasein's tendency to inauthenticity and falling (§38) in light of these Lutheran theological precedents allows us to avoid contriving these phenomena as just contingent psychological traits of humanity.¹⁴⁵ For it is implicit in Heidegger's account that *sometimes* falling in with *das Man* is the eminently *rational* course of action.¹⁴⁶ Heidegger speaks in his *Natorp Report* (1922) of the “basic factual tendency in life toward falling away [*Abfallen*] from itself and, in this, towards falling into [*Verfallen*] the world and thereby itself disintegrating [*Zerfall*].”¹⁴⁷ For Luther, it is not merely that truth is distorted: our very being as we are distorts it; we cannot do otherwise. Inauthenticity, then, is no mere accident or ontic quirk of our times; rather, like sinfulness for Luther, falling

¹⁴⁰ Personal communication, Carleton Christensen, 2012; cf. Crowe, 2006, 71, 99.

¹⁴¹ Possibly the most convincing evidence for this is the length Heidegger goes to distance himself from Luther at H179–80—Heidegger certainly had Luther in mind when writing these passages.

¹⁴² Cf. Crowe, 2006, Ch. 3.

¹⁴³ Christensen, 2009; cf. King, 2001, 82–3.

¹⁴⁴ Crowe, 2006, 50, cf. Ch. 3; Van Buren, 1994a.

¹⁴⁵ MacAvoy, 2001. See also Christensen, 2012.

¹⁴⁶ Christensen, 2012, 283.

¹⁴⁷ Quoted in and translated by Crowe, 2006, 79.

is for Heidegger an ontological structure at the core of Dasein. Insofar as inauthenticity is genuinely ontological, it cannot be something avoidable. Consequently, for Heidegger, that there are circumstances in which being inauthentic is, to put things paradoxically, the authentic thing to be. That is, inauthenticity cannot be something which is *always* or *necessarily* a sub-optimal, not fully rational mode of Dasein's existence. Everything depends on whether Dasein is or does what one is or does *ceteris paribus*, i.e., as the particular circumstances require, and not simply as a flight from debilitating collapse in anxiety.

This intimates, of course, that we need to differentiate between being *objectively* inauthentic, i.e., objectively being and doing what one averagely is and does (which may or may not be a less-than-optimal or Dasein-like mode of being for Dasein); and being *subjectively* inauthentic, i.e., being and doing what one averagely is and does as a way of avoiding the situation in which one can do neither A nor not-A. The latter is precisely falling, that is, flight from anxiety into the One. Dreyfus and Blattner, however, see inauthenticity as the *single* fundamental state of the self in-the-world, and are thus fail to justify why for Heidegger inauthenticity is sometimes sub-optimal, that is, precisely a mode of being in which Dasein is not 'actually' (*eigentlich*) what it is. They are forced to explain falling as an ontologically unfounded human quirk and Heidegger's account of it as confused or arbitrary; merely tacked on.¹⁴⁸ But just as Luther's experience of *destructio* opens the way for a renewal, inauthenticity is for Heidegger just "a distinctive being-in-the-world" (H176, emphasis added)¹⁴⁹—one in which Dasein has *perhaps* abdicated itself from itself, ontically numbed itself, and which hence is not fully or actually (*eigentlich*) self-like.

Reading Heidegger properly thus shows that anxiety neither annihilates Dasein nor reveals there to be nothing beyond the one-self. For the radical collapse of reason about which Dasein is inherently anxious is a tendency towards self-dissolution which anxious

¹⁴⁸ Dreyfus, 1991, 25, 229; D&R 333–6; Blattner, 2006, 128, 131. Against this see MacAvoy, 2001, 461f.; Russell, 2008, 106–111; Christensen, 2012.

¹⁴⁹ Crowe, 2006, 71–2.

Dasein is. In anxiety, one does not disappear nor is there a total absence of significance and self such that we would have to say that Dasein had been annihilated.¹⁵⁰ Rather, with the loss of the motivational force of significances, the ‘alongside’ of Being-in becomes distancing rather than de-distancing. In anxiety, Dasein becomes a paradox to itself: it is isolated from the world and from Others and yet, notwithstanding this, it still is, as the entity whose Being is an issue for it. Existence is so utterly contradictory that, at its limit point, anxiety is a kind of self-dissolution. As such, this situation displays certain parallels to a death of the self, for in death one can do (will) neither A nor not-A. Dasein, defined as an entity essentially -in-the-world, is in anxiety a Being-towards a state in which it can no longer be such an entity—a situation analogous to our human character as mortal. This returns us to the issue instantiating Heidegger’s discussion of anxiety in the ontological sense: a proper elaboration of the wholeness of Dasein. To understand how anxiety in general—that is, the anxiety discussed in §40—contributes to this, we need to turn to Division II and Heidegger’s account of anxiety *in the face of death*.

Anxiety, Death and Unity

A closer examination of anxiety in the face of death can help us to understand anxiety in a way that allows Dasein a deeper unity or constancy, while maintaining Heidegger’s conception of Dasein as capable of “*Being-free for ... authenticity as a possibility which it always is*” (H188). Anxiety involves Being ‘ahead’ of one’s self: for Dasein, there is something standing before us, something “not-yet,” *right to the very end* (see H233–4, H236–7). The concept of an ‘end’ carries with it a notion of wholeness or totality; and, as we shall see, as an ‘end’ death acts as a horizon capable of throwing one’s Being into perspective. This will enable us to establish the primordial totality of Dasein, and show us how Dasein might orient itself towards a deeper constancy than the analysis of Division I alone allows us to describe.

¹⁵⁰ See Bracken, 2005.

Death

In Division II, the possibility of self-dissolution, understood as Dasein's no longer being there/here—its no longer Being-in-the-world—is to be understood as the possibility of an existential end (see H234, H237). Dasein is delivered over to its own Being, which is actualized by the bringing-to-pass of available possibilities of Being in-the-world. So the paradox arises: as long as part of our Being is an ability-to-be—that is to say, so long as we are Dasein—we are still *for ourselves*, and so even in anxiety we must still do something, despite the shrinking away of the external world, which takes with it all possibilities of praxis. Being toward this paradox (which represents my belief-toward-self-dissolution), therefore, is Being-toward-the-end, where 'end' is taken in the strictly existential sense.

For humanity, what makes this so interesting is the concrete case of death. Properly understood, anxiety in the face of death is an anticipation of one's demise (H247) which requires one to deal with anxiety in the formal sense.¹⁵¹ This is not uncontroversial: the interpretations of death offered in literature on BT are many and varied. As existing, Dasein's Being is between birth towards death; and so, ultimately, Dasein's being-ahead is pointing towards its mortal end (H244)—and death as its 'end' is all but declared as an object of analysis in the care structure of Dasein's being.¹⁵² While death can be understood 'biographically' as something biological, medical, or scientific (§§47–9), Heidegger is interested in its existential significance. Heidegger outlines the existential ontology of death in §50:¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Personal communication, Carleton Christensen, 2010–12.

¹⁵² Mulhall, 2005a, 298.

¹⁵³ Summary based on that appearing in Bracken, 2005, 547–8.

- i. Death is to be understood as a possibility (of Being),
- ii. “Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility” (H263),
- iii. Death is non-relational: it is a possibility involving Dasein as utterly individuated,
- iv. Death is not to be outstripped: it is Dasein’s uttermost possibility,
- v. Death is certain: there is no way of avoiding it; it will come to pass and in death no one can represent you, and
- vi. Death is indefinite regarding its certainty as impending: Dasein is mortally vulnerable, which means it is a threat which may strike at any time.

Death, therefore, provides a temporal horizon for Being. In Being-ahead, I am (however inadvertently) toward my death, which is certain but indefinite in its time of coming. This possibility of my Being cannot be avoided and is mine alone: it is the ultimate individuating end. As Heidegger puts it, in death, “Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost ability-to-be” (H250, translation amended). This is a step beyond anxiety. All relationships with the world, and with Others are undone, and so there can be no falling as there is no everyday to fall into. It is a relinquishing of one’s self into that ‘nothingness’ which anxiety is anxious about (H251).

McGrath identifies the “clear Lutheran parallels”¹⁵⁴ in Heidegger’s characterisation of death.¹⁵⁵ For both Luther and Heidegger, death is characterised as that which is certain, in which one is unrepresentable and utterly individualised—one is ultimately differentiated and called to stand on one’s own (see LW51, 70).¹⁵⁶ But while Luther’s account is eschatological, Heidegger sees his project as *prior* to the object of theology: so while Heidegger secularises Luther’s account, he does not merely transpose the structure of Protestant or Christian faith into BT by removing references to its theological

¹⁵⁴ McGrath, 2006, 169.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 153.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

implications.¹⁵⁷ Being-toward-death does not, for Heidegger, disclose our standing before God; rather it is capable of bringing us face-to-face with Being-in-the-world; which is ontologically prior to the being or entity called God.

Anxiety in the face of death

When Dasein does not flee from its ownmost Being-toward death, it experiences anxiety in the face of death (H251). This is not fear: in this situation, Dasein is facing its most original Being. This anxiety discloses Dasein's primordial thrownness into death: Dasein simply is "delivered over to its death, and ... death thus belongs to Being-in-the-world" (H251). The experience of this realisation parallels that of Luther in the storm which provides us with an access point to discussing what Heidegger means by anxiety in the face of death. The lightning strike plunged Luther into the utter reality that would one day die, and that this might well happen now. He already knew this, and he knew death could also happen at any other times: but he was brought into brute contact with its existential significance. In anxiety, Dasein's ability-to-be-in-the-world is shown to include not-being-in-the-world; and the confronting of sheer mortality forces us to confront the sheer possibility of our Being (H251).

How does this relate to Dasein's wholeness? Heidegger's language, here—at least as it is translated—lends itself easily to interpretations which render the suggestion of Dasein's unity at best implausible. Heidegger tells us that anxiety, as experienced in the face of death, discloses mortal Dasein's ultimate potentiality as its ultimate 'not' or 'nothing': it discloses "the nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] by which Dasein, in its very basis, is defined" (H308). For D&R, this is why "[a]nxiety reveals that the self has no possibilities of its own, and so Dasein's response to anxiety cannot be to find some resource in itself. ... [T]here is no human potential."¹⁵⁸ To D&R, then, the only coherence or unity of self in which anxiety might be somehow involved is that which is constructed by authentic

¹⁵⁷ Russell, 2011, 646–7.

¹⁵⁸ D&R, 304–5.

Dasein out of understanding and accepting its Being a purposeless and alienated nullity. As outlined earlier, there are several problems with this.

As King notes, Dasein's ultimate 'nothingness' can be better understood in conjunction with Heidegger's lecture, 'What is Metaphysics?'.¹⁵⁹ Heidegger does not refer to a lack, or a substantial ontological void or absence (H286);¹⁶⁰ and neither does he refer to the absurd.¹⁶¹ In the anxiety of being-toward-death Dasein's essential 'not' or 'nullity' is revealed (H283): that is, we are shown that beyond our Being-in-the-world we are *nothing* (H307). This is in part a claim about the way we interpret the Being of Dasein: for Heidegger, this must be articulated differently to that of a 'thing', and hence Dasein is literally 'no-thing'; not a thing. Dasein is defined against the *basis* or ground of its ultimate, ownmost potentiality, which is an uttermost nothingness (H330). As an ontological 'possibility' for Dasein, nothingness is the impossibility that Dasein is in death. In Bracken's words, "nullity is only 'there' in anxiety as the possibility of no longer being able to take up possibilities authentically or inauthentically."¹⁶² Like any other potentiality-for-Being, death is something Dasein comports itself towards; and thus, death, as certain (but indefinite in its coming) has the ability to throw Being into perspective (H264).¹⁶³

In order to see past the dilemmas presented by D&R's reading, we cannot interpret Dasein through this neo-social-behaviourist lens. Reading Heidegger's analysis of death in conjunction with Luther allows us to do just this. Authentically, death stands before us in the way that it did for Luther in his experience of being caught in the storm. In his acute fear of death, he was at this moment afraid to be struck down before he had a chance to settle his accounts with himself and with God. For Luther, the realisation that

¹⁵⁹ King, 2001, 174.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 176.

¹⁶¹ McGrath, 2006, 133.

¹⁶² Bracken, 2005, 549.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 549.

he might die was the realisation of a constant anxiety which he had, an anxiety of being ripped away before his time. In Being-toward-death, Dasein is provided with the awareness of a limit to the time it has available for the resolution of the incoherence faced in anxiety. My death as impending makes very real the possibility that I might *never* work this paradox out. Thus, the animal fear of death gets appropriated as anxiety about death, and becomes available as a motivational force: as an authentic self, I do not want Being to end, I do not want to be ripped or torn away before I work this out; before I can, as it were, settle these accounts.

This is why Heidegger tells us that “Anxiety liberates [Dasein] from possibilities which ‘count for nothing’ [‘*nichtigen*’], and lets him become free for those which are authentic” (H344). In authentic Being-toward-death, then, you are comporting yourself as it were towards entities in the world in a way which genuinely brings your ‘self,’ as it were, to the fore. It is in this way that you gain a sense of remaining the same across time—of self-constancy (*Selbstständigkeit*) (H322). This is not merely a constancy of self but a self-owned constancy with self, for which you are in some sense uniquely responsible. As authentic Dasein, you are settling *your* accounts, and this gives you a genuine independence, a genuine autonomy (H322).

This is not to say that I must not or cannot defer this issue to another day—while I might want or intend in some way to resolve this, I might lack the courage or will to do so. Or I might just not care. Being-in-the-world is not due to any sort of knowing choice either to be here or not to be: Dasein is simply thrown into the world, subjected to the world, thrown into a set of ways of responding to the world. As such, thrownness can be understood as a manner of basic turning away (H136): one is confronted with the world all the time, every day, and thus it makes sense to evade it, to periodically find respite in falling into *das Man*.¹⁶⁴ Falling allows one to find the ability to set up walls between one’s

¹⁶⁴ Falling is *motivated*. See Russell, 2008, 106–111.

self and the exhausting matter of one's own Being,¹⁶⁵ so allowing Dasein to avoid being consumed in self-dissolution. We are entitled to trivialise in a very legitimate sense: we need to avoid the bare reality of our Being in order that we might go on Being. But even in this refuge of everydayness, we are still comporting ourselves ahead of ourselves—and thus we cannot avoid comporting ourselves *in some sense* toward our ultimate temporal horizon (H251f.).¹⁶⁶ The everyday self, engaged inauthentically as a one-self with *das Man*, is comporting itself toward death by fleeing from it (H251).

But while death is coming, it is indefinite in its coming¹⁶⁷—and thus proximally and for the most part it *makes sense* to put off dealing with it. Like any form of falling, putting off dealing with death is a temptation and a tranquilisation, a refuge in *das Man* which also therefore involves an alienation of our authentic selves (§51). But here is no point, in the everyday, of being too worried about that which is definitely indefinite and completely unavoidable. It is much more practicable just to get on with everyday life.

¹⁶⁵ Carman, 2005.

¹⁶⁶ Mulhall, 2005a, 308.

¹⁶⁷ I am not, here, talking about cases of suicide or being killed, to which Heidegger's analysis does not apply.

Further, we have seen that anxiety should not be characterised as a depression or annihilation. Instead, anxiety undoes Dasein in such a way that it shows Dasein as “*Being-free for*” itself and its authenticity; a freedom which, in the face of death, becomes the basis upon which an orientation toward authentic existence is founded. To the phenomenologist, then, anxiety *necessitates* Heidegger’s account of authenticity in Division II: it shows us that there is something that has not yet been addressed in Heidegger’s analysis, namely, who and what Dasein is in anxiety such that it can survive it, and how this is a part of Dasein as a whole—the unity and difference which Dasein is. This kind of reading is only possible when Heidegger’s preparatory fundamental ontology is taken to have significance beyond what we might consider our particular instance of *das Man*—and indeed, the successful reading of Heidegger in conjunction with Luther demonstrates this very point. Anxiety, like falling, must not be confined to the Dasein of late modernity as an arbitrary psychological quirk; rather, these are to be considered ontological determinants of Dasein.

Conclusion

Heidegger tells us that the phenomenon of anxiety, from which we are always inclined to ‘flee’, thereby ‘falling’ back into the One, indicates that Dasein possesses a deeper unity or constancy of self (§45) than that of the one-self. For the Dreyfus School, this is an impossible claim which they can only explain away by appeal to egregious error on Heidegger’s part. But the interpretation offered here encounters no such problem. Moreover, as revealed in the outline just given of death and anxiety in the face of death, it intimates that it is quite possible to read *BT* as a coherent whole. One does not, therefore, have to resort to the extreme measures taken by Dreyfus and Blattner in order to explain the presence of Division II.

Let us finish by noting some of the directions in which the interpretation outlined here might take us. I have not had space here to explore the implications of this account for our conception of authenticity. But it does follow from the interpretation provided here that the authentic self, the self which relates to the voice of conscience with fore-running resoluteness, must be an anxious self which does not flee from its anxiousness but rather holds out in it. Authentic Dasein must, as Heidegger says (H322), run the risk of anxiety in the extreme sense exhibited by Luther. It also follows from this account that anxiety does not sever ties with the world such that a subject must, in order to be authentic, withdraw from the world, which would contradict what Heidegger expressly says—see H298. Finally and perhaps most importantly, it follows from this interpretation that the perseverance in anxiety which Heidegger associates with authentic being-a-self (H322) cannot be a voluntaristic or decisionistic willing of the same. Heidegger might be thought to be giving an account of how we might live *from out of* authenticity—rather than, as the Dreyfus School seems to hold, *according to* the dictates of inauthenticity, or as the decisionistic reading of Löwith, Wolin and Habermas holds, according to the dictates of authenticity.

I have sought to show how Heidegger's account of anxiety might be thought as constituting a phenomenological explication of a tendency to self-dissolution inherent to the self in virtue of its character as a reason-wielding, self-consciously thinking, finite will. If we understand Heidegger's *Being and Time* as representing, in its implications, a critique of traditional conceptions of the rational subject as *animal rationale*, then we might see BT as providing material for a critique of the distinctively modern tendency to make exaggerated claims about the capacity of human reason and the rational will.¹⁶⁸ Culminating in its treatment of authentic selfhood in Division II, BT might be thought as seeking to show that traditional conception of reason is too narrow. This would be to understand Heidegger as attempting to recover a more adequate conception by drawing upon traditions ignored by the mainstream of Western philosophy: the theological, mystical and spiritual. Heidegger's fundamental ontology of Dasein can show us that there is much to be found in the writings of the likes of Augustine, Meister Eckhart, Luther and Kierkegaard which might help us to understand what it is to be a self—a rational agent.

¹⁶⁸ Personal communication, Carleton Christensen, 2010–2.

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